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APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against the defendant
claiming damages arising out of a business relationship between
the parties.

Defendant answered the Complaint and submitted

Interrogatories to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff failed to answer

said Interrogatories or comply with a Court Order by the Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., that the Complaint would be dismissed upon
failure to answer said Interrogatories within fifteen (15) days.
Approximately three (3) months later the Honorable Marcellus K.
Snow entered an Ex Parte Order that the Complaint be dismissed

with prejudice for failure to comply with the prior Court Order to
file Answers to Interrogatories.

Defendant thereafter filed a

Motion to Vacate the Order entered by Judge Snow, which was
granted and the case placed on the District Court trial calendar.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower Court granted plaintiff's Motion to Vacate
Order along with placing the case on the regular District Court
trial calendar and awarding the defendant $100.00 in attorney's
fees.

From this Order defendant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an Order of this Honorable Court
reversing the Order of Judge Snow and directing that the Dismissal
with Prejudice be reinstated, that the case be removed from the
trial calendar and declared to be finally resolved on the merits
by reason of this and the original Order of Dismissal for failure
to answer the Interrogatories submitted by defendant.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

On July 1, 1974, defendant submitted Interrogatories
to the plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. (R. 44,45)

Plaintiff did not answer the Interrogatories

as requested, and on January 23, 1975, defendant filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to provide discovery by
answering the Interrogatories submitted July 1, 1974. (R. 43)
Said Motion by defendant was heard on February 3, 1975, by the
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., at which time he entered his
Order that the Motion to Dismiss was granted unless plaintiff
answered the Interrogatories within fifteen (15) days. (R. 40)
Thereafter, a copy of said Order was sent to plaintiff's
attorney. (R. 40)
On May 5, 1975, defendants Motion of Dismissal with
Prejudice came on for hearing before the Honorable Marcellus K.
Snow, and the Court thereupon entered its Order dismissing the
above entitled action with prejudice. (R. 35)

On May 13, 1975,

plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate the Order of said Judge Snow,
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but misnumbered the file, to wit; 21660, instead of 216660 (R. 34)
Plaintiff, thereafter filed a notice of hearing on said Motion
on September 9, 197 5, almost four (4) months thereafter.

Defendant

was not aware that a Motion had been filed since it was not
placed in tne proper file at the time of filing.

At the hearing

on said Motion, it was continued without date, to be reset on
the Law and Motion Calendar.

Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Order

was then renoticed for hearing on November 5, 197 5, whereupon it
was continued until December 11, 1975, to allow the parties to
file Affidavits.

On December 11, 1975, almost a year and a half

later, plaintiff filed Answers to defendant's Interrogatories.
(R. 18-20)

At the hearing on plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Order

on December 11, 197 5, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, ruled
that this Motion just be heard by the Judge who had entered the
Order subject to the Motion.

The Motion was then referred to

Judge Snow, who on February 17, 1976, again continued said Motion
without date. On March 12, 1976, the Motion was heard by said
Judge Marcellus K. Snow, who granted the Motion to Vacate his
previous Order dismissing plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice
and ordered that the case be set for trial. Defendant appeals from
that Order and particularly that part ordering that the case be
placed on the trial calendar.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE COURT TO
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE ITS PRIOR
ORDER DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH
PREJUDICE, AND PLACE THE CASE ON THE TRIAL
CALENDAR IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH A PRIOR COURT
ORDER, WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE
PREVIOUS ORDERS OF THE COURT.

Rule 37(b) (2) (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that where a party fails to serve answers or objections
to Interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, "the Court in which
the action is pending on Motion may make such Orders in regard
to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action
authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B) and (C) of Subsection (b) (2)
of this rule."
Paragraph (C) of Subsection (b)(2) states that, "an
Order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a Judgment by Default
against the disobedient party."

(emphasis added)

When plaintiff

had failed by over seven (7) months, to answer the Interrogatories
propounded by defendant, said defendant sought appropriate relief
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from the Court, pursuant to Rule 37(b) (2) (d) , incorporating
Paragraph (C) of Subsection (b)(2) in the manner designated
above.
The Motion to Dismiss as filed by the defendant was
granted on February 3, 1975, and the Order entered on February 7,
1975, by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., after proper Notice
and a hearing thereon. At that time, the plaintiff was ordered
to answer the Interrogatories propounded by defendant within
fifteen (15) days or the Motion to Dismiss would be granted.
Plaintiff has never appealed this Order or moved to set it aside,
or provided any reason why the Interrogatories were not answered
as Ordered by the Court.

The plaintiffs Complaint was dismissed,

therefore, fifteen (15) days after the Order was signed by
Judge Stewart Hanson, Jr., because of this failure by plaintiff
to answer the Interrogatories.
The subsequent Order signed by Judge Marcellus K. Snow
was of no legal effect other than to reiterate, possibly in a
more understandable manner, Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. f s,
previous Order.

However, the subsequent Order of Judge Snow

in placing the case on the regular trial calendar is in error,
since the previous Order of Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., is a
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final Order and has never been appealed from or vacated in any
manner.

This ruling, which places the case on the trial calendar,

is ineffective since it attempts to overrule the Order of another

District

Court Judge,

and one District

Court Judge cannot alter

or

vary an Order of another District Court Judge pursuant to a Motion
by one of the parties.

In Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P2d 821,

823 (1974), the Court held that, " (a) lthough it is not impossible
under some circumstances, for one District Judge to vacate the
Orders of his collegues, - ordinarily this cannot be done.

To

accomplish this feat would require such a procedure as appeal, or
an unusual, independent procedure of some kind, - but not in
virtue of the ordinary motions, orders to show cause and the
like . . . "
The defendant does not deny that the Court may vacate
its own ruling dismissing plaintiff's Complaint.

However, it is

error for the Court to vacate its Order and at the same time
place the matter on the trial calendar.

This is outside the scope

of its original ruling and in effect overrules the previous Order
of Judge Stewart Mw Hanson, Jr., dismissing plaintiff's Complaint
for failure to provide discovery.
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Peterson v. Peterson, supra.

Even if this Court should uphold the Order Granting the Motion to
Vacate, it must deny the lower court's right to place the case
on the trial calendar, since the case is still dismissed for_failure
to make discovery, and the Order signed by Judge Marcellus K. Snow
had no effect other than to dismiss a case which was already
dismissed.

Judge Snow did state, however, in the Order, itself,

that the case was Dismissed with Prejudice, while the original;
Order of Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., was silent as to whether
it was dismissed with or without prejudice.
Even, in this respect- the^QxcLer conformed to that of
Judge Hanson, Jr., since an involuntary dismissal i s a final
adjudication unless otherwise specified * Rule 41(b) provides in
part that, "unless the Court in its Order for dismissal otherwise
specifier, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal
not provided for in this Rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable
party, operates as an adjudication on the merits."

In the case

of Steiner v. State, 27 U2d 284, 495 P2d 809 (1972), the plaintiff
filed an action against the State of Utah and Nephi City claiming
negligence, to which both defendants filed Motions to Dismiss.
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On December 12, 1968, both Motions were granted and Orders entered
accordingly.

Although the Order entered by the City of Nephi

stated that the action was dismissed with prejudice, the Order
regarding the State of Utah read as follows:
"It is hereby Ordered that the Motion of
defendant, State of Utah, to dismiss plaintiff's
Complaint, is granted, and the same is hereby
dismissed."
No Motion to alter or amend and no appeal was taken from this
Order.

One year later, on December 12, 1969, the plaintiffs

filed a Second Amended Complaint to which. bot±L_defendants- again
made Motions- to Dismiss-*. Bottt Orders—were gran±ed,_ and the
plaintiffs appealed after filing a Motion for Rehearing, which
was denied.

The Court held on appeal that, "The order entered

on December 12, 1968, dealing with the motion of Nephi City to
dismiss the complaint recited that the order dismissing the
complaint was with prejudice and on the merits and it was the
final adjudication of the issues as between the plaintiffs and
the City and the time for appeal commenced to run upon entry
of the Order.

The order of dismissal made pursuant to the

State's motion to dismiss was without prejudice insofar as the

_9_

State of Utah was concerned.

However, even though the dismissal

was without prejudice the order was a final adjudication and did
noc authorize the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint in
these proceedings."
In the present case on appeal, the original Order of
Dismissal entered by Judge Hanson, Jr., acted as a final adjudication on the merits which did not authorize the plaintiff to
file an Amended Complaint, therefore, effectively rising to the
status of a Dismissal with PrejudicePOiNT HE.
JUDGE SNOW SHOULD NOT HAVE VACATED HIS ORDER
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WHERE THE
ORDER, IF AT ALL, CONSTITUTED HARMLESS ERROR
IN DUPLICATING JUDGE STEWART Mo HANSON, JR.'S,
ORDER. FURTHER, IT CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL
ERROR TO THE DEFENDANT TO PLACE THE ACTION
ON THE TRIAL CALENDAR WHEN THE PRIOR COURT
ORDER OF DISMISSAL REMAINS IN EFFECT.
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that, "No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in
anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties
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is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to
the court inconsistent with substantial justice.

The court at

every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect
in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties."

Since plaintiff's Complaint was already dis-

missed on uhe merits at the time Judge Snow entered his Order
of Dismissal with Prejudice, with the plaintiff having made no
Motion to alter or amend that Order and his appeal time having
expired,. such Order didi aot~a£fect the- plaintiff*^ aubsrtaj&tiaL
rights, but: was at the most, only harmless error.

As a result,

the lower court committed reversible error by vacating the
dismissal of plaintifffs Complaint where the plaintiff could
only show that harmless error had been committed.
Although nothing appears to prevent a District Judge
from entering an Order in conformance with another District
Judge's prior ruling, he cannot reverse or alter the ruling
made by such other District Court Judge.
supra.

Peterson v. Peterson,

By placing this case, which was previously dismissed
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by another Judge onto the trial calendar, the lower court has
abused its authority and committed an error that is detrimental
to the substantial rights of the defendant, who is once again
faced wirh defending a suit that has been dismissed.

This is

a clear abuse of discretion of the type warranting a reversal
of the lower court. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U 416,
260 P2d 741 (1953).
Although the reviewing Court will not reverse because
of mere error, it will reverse a lower court ruling where the
errors-is substantial and-- pre ju&xeial irr the senise that there is
a reasonable liklihood that unfairness or injustice has resulted.
Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 27 U2d 188,
493 P2d 1283 (1972).
Further, statemsnts set forth in the Motion to
Vacate Order and Affidavit of plaintiff do not show any mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect on the part of the
defendant, any newly discovered evidence, any fraud or misrepresentation or any reason for which the Judgment or Order is void,
satisfied or released or any other reason for which this Court
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has allowed relief from a Judgment or Order pursuant to Rule 60(b)
of rhe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the
trial court abused its discretion in vacating its own Order of
Dismissal, and further committed prejudicial error in placing this
case on the trial calendar, in that, doing so requires one District
Court Judge to overrule another; and that this-Count shouJIcE determine that-the present case is aot subject tcr further*: litigationshaving been dismissed on its merits by the previous, unamended
or vacated, Order of the prior sitting District Court Judge.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
RYBERG & McCOY
Robert Ryberg
Attorney for defendant-appellant
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